This paper uses data from a new question in the 2011 UK censuses of population to investigate national identities among ethnic and religious minorities. It focuses primarily on Scotland, while presenting comparative data for England and Wales. A robust comparison of national identities between different minorities in Scotland and with similar groups in other nations of Britain has previously not been possible because ethnic and religious minority groups represent a small proportion of Scotland's population and are weakly represented in sample surveys. The new census question on national identity therefore offers an unprecedented opportunity for this kind of analysis. The analysis is used to critically evaluate previous claims of the existence of multicultural nationalism in Scotland and previous research that has suggested that Scottish identity is relatively inclusive of people in minority groups. The findings suggest that while Scottish national identity is relatively inclusive of minorities in some respects, the conclusions of previous research should be treated with some caution.
Introduction
This paper addresses the relationship between multiculturalism and multinationalism in the UK, and more specifically in Scotland. It aims to explore how national plurality (the existence of different historic nations within the same state) and ethno-religious plurality (related to more recent immigration to that state) may be reconciled. This is examined via a specific focus on the national identification of people in ethnic and religious minority groups. To this end, the paper employs data from a unique source: the new question on national identity introduced in the 2011 UK censuses. This allows, for the first time, both a robust comparison of national identities across different minority groups in Scotland, and also a comparison with corresponding minorities in other UK sub-state nations.
The paper assesses the extent to which the apparently inclusive nature of Scottish identity with respect to minority groups that has been suggested by previous research is substantiated by the census data. Since this relative inclusivity has sometimes been described as multinational multicultural citizenship or multicultural nationalism, we begin by examining these concepts before discussing relevant empirical research, outlining the data and methods, and presenting the analysis and conclusions.
Multicultural Citizenship and Multicultural Nationalism
A key contemporary concern is the maintenance and fostering of social cohesion within national populations that are increasingly diverse in their ethnic origins, and it is commonly suggested that in multicultural societies members of the nation should share an overarching identity which sits above more particular affinities. This often takes the form of shared citizenship (e.g. Kivisto 2002) or national identity. Asari, Halikiopoulou and Mock, for example, argue that 'a strong national identity, albeit of a particular kind, is prerequisite to a stable and functioning multicultural society ' (2008, 2) . However, as implied by their
The third and fourth ideal types are more significant, and considered at more length by Kymlicka, because unlike the first two approaches he deems these to be normatively acceptable. Significantly for our purposes in this paper, Kymlicka also illustrates these through reference to the UK, and more specifically Scotland. In the third, 'postnational' type, immigrants are encouraged to identify with the state level rather than one of the sub-state nations, e.g. as British rather than Scottish. While one attraction of this approach is its capacity to transcend national cleavages (e.g. immigrants may become British without allegiance to any of the constituent nations of the UK), Kymlicka also highlights some limitations. One of these is that if immigrants can readily identify with the state level, then this does not encourage sub-state nations to be defined in ways that are inclusive of these immigrants.
In the fourth, 'multinational' ideal type, immigrants are encouraged to identify with the substate nation, e.g. as Scottish rather than British, and sub-state national identities must therefore be (re)conceptualised as multicultural. Kymlicka suggests that in some respects Scotland represents a successful example of the multinational model of multicultural citizenship, because there is evidence that some key minority groups show substantial levels of support for the most obvious political manifestations of Scottish nationalism: an independent Scotland and the Scottish National Party. While a 'postnational' perspective would view immigrant support for the disintegration of the state in which they are resident as an integration failure, Kymlicka argues that from the multinational perspective this reflects successful integration in that (some) minorities exhibit the same mixture of politicalconstitutional positions as people in Scotland more generally: i.e. (British) unionist, devolutionist and secessionist. This he contrasts with Quebec, where the absence of any significant support for secession among immigrants in the 1995 referendum indicated a failure of multinational integration.
To support his argument (especially concerning Scotland) Kymlicka draws on earlier work by Hussain and Miller (2006) on 'multicultural nationalism' in Scotland. Although initially it might seem that this is a somewhat different concept to Kymlicka's multicultural citizenship, nationalism and citizenship are in some ways closely related and, as noted above, shared citizenship and/or national identity are often proposed as important unifying elements in multicultural societies. The essential concerns of Kymlicka and Hussain and Miller are also similar in many respects. Both examine how multiculturalism and sub-state nationalism may accommodate one another, and in doing so both consider the 'top-down' dimension (policies and discourses of governments and political elites) and the 'bottom-up' dimension (perspectives of people in immigrant and minority groups). Both also use Scotland as a key example.
Hussain and Miller develop their argument from evidence derived from a survey, interviews and focus groups with ethnic Pakistanis in Scotland. While they initially observe that multicultural nationalism in sub-state contexts appears close to being an oxymoron because it is inherently more difficult for sub-state nationalism to accommodate ethnic diversity (2006, 3) , ultimately they conclude that 'multiculturalism and sub-state nationalism have not merely coexisted but actually interacted positively within Scotland ' (2006, 199) . One of the key findings on which this conclusion is based is that there are high levels of Scottish national identification among ethnic Pakistanis. Hussain and Miller suggest this might be because other territorial identities among this group are weak in comparison to cultural identities, most obviously related to being Muslim.
For Hussain and Miller and Kymlicka respectively, then, evidence for the existence of multicultural nationalism or the multinational type of multicultural citizenship in Scotland is substantially based on the (national) identification of people in a particular minority group. It is this specific dimension -national identities among minorities -that will be developed in this paper. First, since both Hussain and Miller and Kymlicka draw on the same body of empirical evidence relating to people of Pakistani origin in Scotland, we explore whether their findings and conclusions are supported by other research concerning the national identities of minorities in Scotland. Second, we reflect on similar evidence from other parts of Britain, addressing not only sub-state but also British identity. Third, and most importantly, we employ a unique and unprecedented data source, firstly to compare Scotland with other UK nations and then to examine it as a specific case in more detail.
National identities and minorities
A substantial body of qualitative research in Scotland has suggested a considerable willingness to identify as Scottish among people in minority groups (Bonino 2015; Hopkins 2007 Hopkins , 2008 Kyriakides, Virdee, and Modood 2009; Saeed, Blain, and Forbes 1999; Virdee, Kyriakides, and Modood 2006) . Aside from the survey dimension of Hussain and Miller's (2006) research, quantitative analysis of national identities among minority groups in Scotland has been more scarce, but has also reached similar conclusions (Bond 2011; Rosie 2014; Rosie and Hepburn 2015) . All this evidence tends to support Kymlicka's argument that Scotland might represent a successful example of the 'multinational' model of minority integration.
That Scottish identity appears to be inclusive of ethnic and religious minorities has been attributed to several factors. First, because cultural (and most specifically linguistic) barriers to integration and national belonging for migrants and minorities are relatively low compared to other prominent sub-state nations. Second, because of a prevailing Scottish political consensus that adopts a positive perspective toward immigration and cultural diversity, which to some extent contrasts with a more negative and cautious perspective at the (UK) state level. Meer (2015) describes this as an 'aspirational pluralism' among political elites in Scotland. Third, because anti-immigrant parties have not been successful in Scotland, and its major nationalist party, the SNP, is explicitly pro-immigration and diversity (Hepburn and Rosie 2014; Hopkins 2008; Leith and Soule 2012) . These second and third factors were reflected in the 2016 EU referendum. Among Scotland's leading politicians there was consensus in support of continuing EU membership and the controversial anti-immigration rhetoric that characterised some of the campaign elsewhere in the UK was not evident. A clear majority of people in Scotland voted to remain in the EU, and following the UK 'Brexit' result Scotland's (SNP) First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon, has been a vocal and active supporter of migrants living in Scotland.
Research concerned with national identities among minorities in Scotland also offers some contrasting findings to similar work in England. Here, some studies have indicated a reluctance to identify as English (Bond 2011; Curtice and Heath 2000; Thomas and Sanderson 2011) , and qualitative research sometimes suggests there is an implicit ethnicising of English identity that does not apply to British identity (Fenton and Mann 2011, 226-7; Leddy-Owen 2014) . Similarly, quantitative research focused largely on England has shown high levels of British national identification among many minority ethnic and religious groups (see e.g. Heath and Demireva 2014; Karlsen and Nazroo 2015; Maxwell 2006; Platt 2014) .
While this might suggest that Kymlicka's 'postnational' rather than 'multinational' ideal type is predominant in England, it is also important not to overlook the potential effect of the transnational quality of Britishness (Mycock 2010, 351) . Cohen (1994, 7) has described the 'frontiers' of Britishness as 'fuzzy', not least because of its former imperial dimension, which endowed British identity with two contrasting elements. On the one hand, it meant that Britishness transcended the borders of Britain itself, accommodating the inhabitants of the wider empire, many of whom came to live in Britain following decolonisation in the mid-late twentieth century. But this imperial legacy is also implicated in more exclusive conceptions of Britishness in that the latter was partly defined in contradistinction to the (largely nonwhite) inhabitants of the overseas empire (Colley 1992) . As Mycock (2010, 351) points out, this imperial dimension persists within the context of the contemporary Commonwealth:
Extensive emigration to and from Commonwealth [sic] continues to contribute to the maintenance of strong family and cultural ties tinged with an enduring sense of empire. Many Britons may well overlook transnational connotations of the British identity and citizenship but it is difficult to deny they persist.
Although comparatively little research has been conducted concerning the national identities of people in minority groups in Wales, we may identify some parallels with both Scotland and England. Similarly to Scotland, devolved governments in Wales have generally encouraged the promotion of 'an ethnically inclusive civic national identity' (Evans, O'Leary and Williams 2015, 5) and the leading nationalist party (Plaid Cymru) has also attempted to shift towards an ideology that is more inclusive of minority groups (Chaney and Fevre, 2001) . But Bradbury and Andrews (2010, 234) suggest that, as in England, people in minority ethnic groups in Wales tend to find a British identity more accommodating and are relatively unlikely to identify as Welsh, and others argue this may be because the centrality of language and culture to Welsh identity can exclude those from minority ethnic backgrounds (Scourfield and Davies 2005; Williams 1999 ).
Nevertheless, some caution is necessary before concluding that, compared to sub-state national identities in other parts of Britain, Scottishness is largely inclusive of those in minority ethnic and religious groups. Research also suggests 'the existence of exclusive, noncivic components within the political and the wider public's discourse of nationalism in Scotland' (Leith and Soule 2012, 145) ; that historical narratives and representations of the (Scottish) nation may privilege whiteness (Virdee, Kyriakides, and Modood 2006, 3.14) ; that experience of interaction with the White majority sometimes leads to a reluctance among minorities to assert a Scottish identity (Hussain and Miller 2006, 151) ; and that feelings of racial and religious difference or otherness can sometimes prevent those in minority groups from fully embracing such an identity (Hopkins 2007, 71) .
Further, despite the considerable value of previous studies concerning the national identities of minorities in Scotland, they are limited in that they focus on specific minority groups and/or are restricted to low sub-sample sizes. They do not therefore offer evidence that allows a reliable comparative analysis of national identities among minority groups across the population of Scotland as a whole. Systematic comparison of Scotland and other sub-state UK territories has also been largely absent, not least because UK analysis of minorities' national identities has often focused on Britishness, neglected the smaller national territories, and/or conflated larger national and state territories such as England/Britain (Hopkins 2008; Virdee, Kyriakides, and Modood 2006; Whittaker 2015; Williams 2015) . Nandi and Platt (2015) do assess and compare state and sub-state national identification among minority groups in the UK, but do not address how this might vary between different UK nations, nor indeed the distribution of minority ethnic cases across these nations.
To assess the conclusions of Kymlicka and Hussain and Miller and address the limitations of previous research on minorities in Scotland, this paper therefore addresses the following questions. To what extent do the national identities of people in different minority groups in Scotland (including, but not limited to, ethnic Pakistanis) appear to confirm the predominance of multicultural nationalism or the multinational model of multicultural citizenship? Do patterns of British identification seem to reflect the postnational model and/or the transnational dimension of Britishness? Do British and sub-state national identities vary across different ethno-religious groups, and which other factors aside from ethnicity and religion might explain these identities?
The Census and national identity: data and analysis
To address these questions, we employ data from the 2011 decennial censuses of population in Scotland and other parts of the UK 1 . Censuses not only attempt to count and classify national populations, but also facilitate the 'imagining' of nations (Anderson 1991; Kertzer and Arel 2002) . While this process contributes to the building of a collective (national) identity, censuses also reflect and construct various sub-national identity categories (Kertzer and Arel 2002, 2) . While censuses in the UK have, since 1851, established the national origins of the population via a question on country of birth (Booth 1985) , only quite recently have questions been introduced which categorise people into different ethnic and religious sub-groups. These questions were to some extent a response to post-war mass immigration to the UK, which resulted in a growing number of children born to immigrants in the UK, who could not therefore be distinguished by country of birth alone.
However, while questions on ethnicity and religion allowed people to identify themselves in more diverse ways that might be distinct from their natal origins, national identity could not necessarily be assumed from people's country of birth, ethnicity and religion. A question on national identity was thus introduced in the census of 2011, motivated to some extent by a desire to improve people's capacity to record their ethnonational identification (Office for National Statistics 2009; Scottish Government and General Register Office for Scotland 2008). Data derived from this question are particularly significant for research in Scotland because they offer a unique opportunity to rigorously assess the national identities of people in various minority ethnic and religious groups. This has previously not been possible using sample surveys which included questions about national identity, principally because of the relatively small minority ethnic population in Scotland.
Our analysis is based on microdata from a random 5 per cent sample of 2011 census returns, published via the UK Data Service (Office for National Statistics 2014; National Records of Scotland 2015). This is preferred to aggregate data covering all census returns for two reasons. First, it facilitates multivariate analysis including bespoke variables. Second, aggregate data include recorded national identities for people of all ages, and will therefore include many cases where these identities have not been autonomously chosen but more likely have been assigned or influenced by a parent or guardian. Although deciding a suitable age threshold for the legitimate expression of subjective identities is difficult and available guidance varies (see e.g. Parameshwaran and Engzell 2015) , to address this limitation only people aged sixteen or over were included in the analysis. Despite these restrictions total case numbers still far exceed those even of very large social surveys (221,495 in Scotland; 2,185,090 England; and 127,081 in Wales) but the data offer the same potential for flexible analysis as any secondary survey data.
There are however other limitations that cannot be addressed by employing the microdata. The census includes only one simple question on national identity, whereas some surveys have also, e.g. sought to assess strength of national identification or belonging (Heath and Demireva 2014; Karlsen and Nazroo 2015; Maxwell 2006; Nandi and Platt 2015; Platt 2014) , and others with a broader range of questions have also, e.g., enabled assessment of whether perceived discrimination or extent of interaction with majority group members might influence national identification among minorities (Maxwell 2006; de Vroome, Verkuyten, and Martinovic 2104) . More fundamentally, some have questioned the capacity of any survey questions to capture the complexity of the conception and employment of national identities (Condor, Gibson, and Abell 2006, 125-6; Hopkins 2007, 66-7; Mann 2011, 111-2) . It is therefore essential that investigation of national identities via more quantitative measures continues to be paralleled by qualitative approaches.
But despite these limitations the census offers unique advantages in allowing reliable analysis of minority groups that represent only a very small proportion of the population. Data and the questions on which they are based also benefit from the resources and rigorous testing that the census provides. Moreover the general expansion and increasing complexity of UK census questions designed to explore subjective identities in recent decades has itself partly been a response to criticisms of the census's limitations in this regard and these questions now take up around 40 per cent of the census forms (Williams and Husk 2015, 295) .
The key dependent variables in the analysis were derived from the census question which offered people a list of national identities from which to choose. As well as British, the substate identities representing each UK nation (English, Welsh, Scottish, Northern Irish) were also explicitly offered, as well as an option to write in another national identity. Although participants were encouraged to select more than one option if appropriate, in Scotland, England and Wales a clear majority chose a sub-state national identity only. In all analysis below, binary dependent variables were used to simply indicate whether someone identified as Scottish, British etc. or not.
The explanatory variables reflect previous research on minorities and national identities. Given the aim of assessing the degree to which different national identities may be more or less inclusive of people in minority groups, ethnicity and religion were included. Ethnicity is also important because it reflects ancestry, which has been described as one of the key 'markers' of national identity (Kiely et al 2001) . These markers are essentially the personal characteristics people employ when asserting their own national identities and evaluating similar assertions made by others (McCrone and Bechhofer 2015, 29) . Religion was also included as an indicator of minority status. Because people in some UK ethnic groups predominantly belong to one religion (e.g. the vast majority of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis are Muslims) whereas others are more spread over different religions (e.g. large numbers of Indians are Hindu, Sikh or Muslim), a series of ethno-religious categories were created within one explanatory variable, reflecting the religious homogeneity of some groups and the diversity of others. This also facilitates comparison with other recent UK research on national identification among minority groups, which has taken a similar approach (see e.g. Karlsen and Nazroo 2015; Nandi and Platt 2015; Platt 2014 ).
Birthplace and residence are also important markers of national identity (Kiely, Bechhofer and McCrone 2005) , and census data allow the evaluation of the significance of both: all individuals state their country of birth and those who were not born in the UK are asked to record the year of their most recent arrival in the country. While birthplace is routinely considered in research on national identities among minorities, some have also highlighted the importance of years spent in the 'host' country by migrants (e.g. de Vroome, Verkuyten, and Martinovic 2014). Taking into account period of residence reflects the possibility that national identification may partly result from socialisation: one may 'become' national (Bond 2006) . The microdata only record a broad period of years within which migrants arrived in the UK (not a specific sub-state nation), from which approximate length of UK residence may be estimated. Both birth and residence variables could not be included separately because the date of arrival variable excludes those born in the UK, so a composite variable was created showing the sub-state UK nation in which people were born, or for those not born in the UK their approximate period of residence.
Although unlike some other sub-state nations linguistic proficiency in a language other than English is often not considered an important element of Scottish identity, Scotland does have its own unique language, Scottish Gaelic, and other research on national identities among minorities has sometimes included linguistic proficiency as an explanatory factor (e.g. de Vroome, Verkuyten, and Martinovic 2014). The 2011 census recorded self-assessed proficiency in both Gaelic and also, for the first time, the Scots language 2 . Both are included as explanatory variables derived from responses to questions regarding perceived ability to understand, read, speak and/or write these languages. Social class was also included to assess whether national identification might be associated with socio-economic status (see e.g. Maxwell 2006; Nandi and Platt 2015; de Vroome, Verkuyten, and Martinovic 2014) .
Analysis is presented in two parts. First, we compare how identification as British and the relevant sub-state national identity (Scottish, English, Welsh) varies across ethno-religious groups in Scotland, England and Wales. Northern Ireland was not included, mainly because the census microdata only distinguish between white people and all others, and do not differentiate between those in different non-Christian religions. Second, more detailed logistic regression models for Scottish and British identification in Scotland are presented to show the variation in national identification across specific ethno-religious groups, controlling for the effects of the other key explanatory variables.
Comparing national identities in Scotland, England and Wales
The ethno-religious groups shown in Table 1 have been constructed to account for the vast majority of cases and the largest minority groups, and also to maintain sufficiently large subsample sizes in Scotland and Wales. The White ethnic majority group in each nation includes those who identify as White British or as White Scottish, English or Welsh. This is because in the census microdata for England and Wales these categories are amalgamated and in Scotland there is only very limited further differentiation between White Scottish and White 'Other British'. The analysis also does not focus separately on religious minorities (e.g. Christians and Jews) who, through their ethnic identification, largely belong to the White majority. Analysis of smaller Christian minorities (cf. Rosie 2014) is also not possible because in England and Wales the Christian category is undifferentiated in the microdata and in Scotland it is only divided into Church of Scotland, Roman Catholic and Other. Cases belonging to unspecified or unusual groups have also been excluded from the analysis (e.g. those in the 'other' ethnic group, or rare combinations such as Pakistani Sikhs or African Buddhists). In Scotland, the African and Caribbean groups are not specifically designated as 'Black', but are here compared with the corresponding Black groups in England and Wales. Different Mixed ethnic categories were also distinguished in England and Wales but not in Scotland, hence to facilitate comparison total data for all Mixed categories combined are also shown for England and Wales. Table 1 here Table 1 shows that in each of the three sub-state nations the White minority groups have lower levels of British identity than the White majority (White British etc.). The Mixed ethnic groups, on the other hand, show higher levels of British identity compared to the White majority in all three nations, with the exception of the White/Black Caribbean and White/Black African groups in Wales. Variation in British identification is most evident among the non-white groups, both between and within nations. In England, British identification in all these groups is higher than the White majority, but varies widely from less than one-third (Chinese or Other Asian: Buddhist) to three-quarters (Bangladeshi Muslim). In Wales, only one non-white group shows a lower level of British identification than the White majority: Black African Christians. As in England, there is wide variation between groups and those in the Bangladeshi and Pakistani Muslim groups and Indian or Other Asian Sikhs show particularly high levels of British identification. These specific findings suggest that the transnational dimension of Britishness, associated historically with the empire and with the contemporary Commonwealth (Mycock 2010) may be important. Focusing on a different post-imperial context -the Netherlands -de Vroome, Verkuyten, and Martinovic (2014, 23) similarly observe that 'It could be that colonial migrants show higher attachment to the host country due to shared history'. The overall findings also confirm the results of previous recent research concerning the British identification of minority groups (Karlsen and Nazroo 2015; Nandi and Platt 2015; Platt 2014) , and are broadly consistent with Kymlicka's 'postnational' type of multicultural citizenship, albeit that the extent to which this is true varies quite widely across different minority groups.
In Scotland, in contrast, although levels of Britishness are substantial among all non-white minorities, in several groups lower proportions identify as British than the White majority. Further, although Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims and Indian and Other Asian Sikhs again show the highest levels of British identification, these are substantially lower than in England and Wales, and this tends to hold true across most other non-white groups.
In each nation a much larger proportion of the White majority identify as Scottish, English or Welsh than as British 3 . It should be noted that some contemporary surveys (e.g. British Social Attitudes) typically show much more evenly balanced levels of English and British identification in England than suggested by the census data, and this contrast might be partly related to methodological factors. It has been suggested that the ordering of identity categories might influence response (e.g. Office for National Statistics 2009), and English was the first category listed in the census form in England (as was Scottish in Scotland, etc.). But the census data are not necessarily very unusual: e.g. analysis of the Annual Population Survey (Bond 2011 ) also shows a much higher degree of English than British identification among the White majority in England. In any event, this paper's key focus is on comparing national identities among the White majority with those of various minorities within each sub-state nation, rather than comparing the national identities of the White majority across these nations.
In all three nations sub-state national identification in the other ethno-religious groups is much lower than the White majority, but there is a marked contrast between Scotland and the other nations among non-white minorities, which is even more evident than with British identity. With the exception of the Black Caribbean or Other Black groups (especially those with no religion), in England and Wales only very small proportions of those in non-white minority groups identify with the sub-state nation. While this is also true of a number of these groups in Scotland, here large minorities of the Pakistani Muslim, Indian or Other Asian Sikh, and Black Caribbean or Other Black (no religion) groups identify as Scottish, and for every minority group with only a single exception (Black Caribbean or Other Black Christians in England) levels of sub-state identification are clearly higher in Scotland than in the other nations.
Therefore, with regard to the question of whether Scottish identification among minorities appears to reflect multicultural nationalism or the multinational model of multicultural citizenship, in comparison to England and Wales at least, the answer is yes. Non-white minorities in Scotland are much more likely to identify with the sub-state nation than are their counterparts in the other nations, where the postnational ideal type appears more appropriate and there is more evidence that the transnational dimension of Britishness is a factor. But there are at least three substantial qualifications to this conclusion. First, this is not equally true for all minorities. The conclusions of Kymlicka and of Hussain and Miller regarding Scotland were based on ethnic Pakistanis, the vast majority of whom are Muslims. Some previously relevant qualitative research in Scotland has also mainly addressed this group (Hopkins 2007; Saeed, Blain, and Forbes 1999) or 'Asian Muslims' more widely (Kyriakides, Virdee, and Modood 2009; Virdee, Kyriakides, and Modood 2006) . But the analysis thus far suggests that Pakistani Muslims, while indeed showing quite high levels of Scottish identification, might not be representative of minority groups more generally in Scotland. While nearly half of adult Pakistani Muslims identify as Scottish, in many other groups less than one-fifth do so. Second, British identification is still substantial among Mixed and nonwhite minority groups in Scotland, and for nearly all groups this is actually more prominent than Scottish identity. This suggests that Kymlicka's postnational model also applies to Scotland to a considerable extent, and that the transnational dimension of Britishness is also relevant to Scotland, albeit not as prominently as in England and Wales. Finally, Scottish identification among all minority groups is much lower than it is among the White majority, which once more does not unequivocally suggest a national context in which multicultural nationalism or the multinational model of multicultural citizenship predominate.
Explaining national identities among minority groups in Scotland
The variation in national identification shown in Table 1 might result, at least partly, from differences between the groups relating to other key markers of national identity, most notably country of birth but also, for those not born in the UK or in Scotland, their period of residence in the country. Tables 2 and 3 These are binary logistic regressions because in each model the dependent variable simply reflects whether a Scottish or British national identity was chosen or not. While Table 2 shows how various minority groups differ from the White majority, in order to give a clearer presentation of how these minority groups compare with each other, Table 3 excludes the White majority from the analysis. In other respects the structure of these tables is similar, save that the order of the ethno-religious groups is changed in Table 3 to offer the clearest comparison with the Pakistani Muslim group, which is used as the reference category rather than White British etc. This is done because Pakistani Muslims are the largest non-white minority group in Scotland and, as we have seen, they provide the key evidential basis for the conclusions of Kymlicka and Miller and Hussain. For ease of reference, each of the four models across the two tables is labelled with its own number (Model 1, Model 2 etc.).
In each model all variables are categorical, and the reference category for each is shown in brackets. Where the regression coefficient (B) is positive this indicates people in that category are more likely to identify as Scottish (or British) compared to people in the reference category, and if the B coefficient is negative the reverse is true. For each coefficient there is an indication of whether and at what level the difference from the reference category is statistically significant and the standard error (S.E) is shown to indicate the breadth of the confidence interval. Odds ratios are also presented: the further these deviate from 1, the greater the difference in levels of identification between that category and the reference category, controlling for the other variables. Odds ratios greater than 1 indicate that people in that category of the variable are more likely to identify as Scottish (or British) compared to people in the reference category, and odds ratios less than 1 show the reverse.
Each model also shows the overall pseudo R 2 value (Nagelkerke R 2 ). Potentially ranging from 0 to 1, this gives an indication of how much the explanatory variables help us account for variation in Scottish and British identification, with values closer to 0 indicating a weaker explanatory 'fit'. For each model the variables were also entered separately in four blocks, beginning with ethno-religious group. Monitoring the increase in R 2 with the addition of the further explanatory variables (birth-residence, occupational class, and finally the two language variables) therefore reflects the extent to which these variables add to our understanding of variation in national identities compared to ethno-religious group alone.
Tables 2 and 3 here
A number of the key findings in Scotland from Table 1 hold true after controlling for the effects of the other explanatory variables. Table 2 shows that those in the White minority groups are less likely than the White majority to identify as Scottish (Model 1) or British (Model 2) whereas those belonging to Mixed ethnic groups are less likely than the White majority to identify as Scottish but more likely to identify as British. This is also true for most of the non-white groups, and Table 3 shows that there is substantial variation in levels of Scottish (Model 3) and British (Model 4) identification across these groups. As researchers focusing mainly on national identities among minorities in England have often found (Karlsen and Nazroo 2015; Maxwell 2006) , being Muslim is certainly no barrier to identifying as British, but the evidence from Scotland suggests, firstly, that this is also true of Scottish identity to some extent at least, but secondly, that the specific Muslim ethnic group to which one belongs is also likely to influence national identity. Model 3 shows that whereas Bangladeshi and Indian or Other Asian Muslims are significantly less likely to identify as Scottish than are Pakistani Muslims, this is not true of African or Arab Muslims.
Focusing on the three Indian or Other Asian groups also illustrates the value of taking religion into account alongside ethnic group. While Indian or Other Asian Muslims and Hindus are significantly less likely to identify as Scottish (Model 3) or British (Model 4) than are Pakistani Muslims, Sikhs are also significantly less likely to identify as British but do not differ significantly from Pakistani Muslims in their Scottish identification. These differences in British identification between groups whose origins are largely in former British colonies also suggests that the post-imperial dimension of Britishness is less clearly evident in Scotland.
Both birthplace and (for migrants to the UK) duration of residence have some influence on both Scottish and British identification, but in quite different ways. Compared to those born in Scotland, all those born elsewhere are much less likely to identify as Scottish. This is true whether the White majority are included (Model 1) or we focus only on minority groups (Model 3). Both models also indicate that, for those born outside the UK, duration of residence does have some effect: longer-term residents are considerably more likely to identify as Scottish than are more recent arrivals, but still much less likely than the Scottishborn. Overall then, birthplace is key to Scottish identity, which has been well-established in previous research (Bond 2006; Kiely et al 2001 Kiely et al , 2005 and 'becoming' Scottish is relatively unusual, even for migrants who are likely to be very long-term residents in Scotland. In relation to British identification in Scotland (Models 2 and 4), birthplace is most obviously significant in the sense that those living in Scotland who were born in one of the other UK nations are considerably more likely to see themselves as British than are those born in Scotland, but it is not significant in the sense that, unlike Scottish identity, not being born in the UK is clearly no obstacle to becoming British. Rather, residence appears the key marker of Britishness for migrants, because those who have lived in the UK for a relatively long period of time are considerably more likely to identify as British than are those born in Scotland, whereas relatively recent migrants (resident less than 8-10 years) are less likely to do so.
The different ways in which the key markers of national identity are implicated in identification as Scottish or British are also reflected in the R 2 values for the four models in Tables 2 and 3 . Although some caution is necessary in comparing pseudo R 2 across different models in logistic regression, the different contribution which each explanatory variable makes to the total R 2 within each model suggests some interesting contrasts. Ethno-religious group contributes more markedly to variation in Scottish identification when the White majority are included (Model 1) than for minorities only (Model 3). In Model 1, adding this variable alone gives an R 2 = 0.218 compared to only 0.091 in Model 3, reflecting the fact that differences in Scottish identification are much more marked between the White majority and the various minority groups than they are between these minority groups. But although ethnicity (and hence ancestry) is therefore an important marker of Scottish identity to some extent, in both models it is the birth-residence variable that makes the most marked contribution to variation in Scottish identification, increasing R 2 from 0.218 to 0.563 in Model 1 and from 0.091 to 0.361 in Model 3. Since the detailed regression coefficients in each model indicate that this effect is largely attributable to birthplace rather than period of residence, this confirms the centrality of birthplace as a marker of Scottish identity for people in general and also more specifically for minorities.
When we examine Britishness (Models 2 and 4) the effect of the initial addition of the ethnoreligious group variable alone is different to that found for Scottish identification. When the White majority are included (Model 2) this variable only yields an initial R 2 value of 0.018 compared to 0.182 when the White majority are excluded (Model 4). The coefficients suggest this is because (with the marginal and non-significant exception of Bangladeshi Muslims) compared to Pakistani Muslims levels of British identification are consistently lower among people in the other minority groups. This again suggests that national identities among Pakistani Muslims might not be representative of other minority groups in Scotland that have been less researched. More similarly to the models of Scottish identity, the birth-residence variable again contributes substantially to variation in British identification, increasing R 2 from 0.018 to 0.079 in Model 2 and from 0.182 to 0.356 in Model 4. But, in contrast to Scottish identification (Models 1 and 3) the regression coefficients indicate that both birthplace and residence are important dimensions in this increase.
Finally, compared to the key markers of national identity discussed above, occupational class and language proficiency do not contribute much to our overall capacity to explain variation in Scottish or British identification: adding these variables only increases R 2 modestly in each of the four models. Nevertheless, these variables do show some significant and clear effects. Especially when the White majority are included (Models 1 and 2 ), compared to those in higher managerial and professional groups people in other class categories are more likely to see themselves as Scottish but less likely to identify as British, and these differences are particularly evident in the more working-class categories (semi-routine and routine occupations). Although a similar general pattern is evident among minorities only (Models 3 and 4), here inter-group differences are rather less marked and indeed some are not statistically significant.
Perceived Gaelic language proficiency is positively associated with Scottish national identification (Model 1) and negatively associated with British identification (Model 2), but these effects appear to be restricted to the White majority, as they are less marked and indeed not significant among minorities only (Models 3 and 4) 5 . Degree of Gaelic proficiency also does not have any further effect even when the White majority are included. Proficiency in Scots (and perceived degree of this proficiency) is positively associated with Scottish identification whether the White majority are included (Model 1) or not (Model 3), but has no clear effect on British identification (Models 2 and 4).
Discussion and Conclusions
The analysis substantiates the conclusions of Kymlicka and Hussain and Miller and the findings of previous, largely qualitative research to some extent at least. Compared to substate identities in other parts of Britain, Scottish national identity is relatively inclusive of those in (particularly non-white) minority ethno-religious groups. Multicultural nationalism and the multinational model of multicultural citizenship are more apparent in Scotland than in England and Wales, where Kymlicka's postnational model is more evident. However, the findings also suggest that these conclusions need to be tempered in at least three key respects.
First, if we examine national identities across various ethno-religious minorities in Scotland then even when we control for the effects of birthplace and other potentially influential variables people in minority groups are still considerably less likely to identify as Scottish than the White majority. Birthplace is certainly key, in that 'becoming' Scottish on the basis of long-term residence and/or socialisation is somewhat rare, but ancestry as a marker of national identity (here reflected by ethno-religious background) is also significant. Second, variation in national identification between minority groups suggests that focusing on Pakistani Muslims might give a somewhat exaggerated sense of the degree to which multicultural nationalism prevails in Scotland. People in most other minority groups are significantly less likely to identify as Scottish than are Pakistani Muslims, even after accounting for the effects of other important variables. Why might this be? Hussain and Miller's (2006) argument that because of the centrality of cultural-religious identities for Pakistanis they adopt (new) territorial identities relatively easily would appear to have some weight. But this does not fully explain variation in Scottish identities between minority groups because people in some other Muslim groups are less likely to identify as Scottish than some non-Muslim groups. Hussain and Miller's argument also does not explain why Pakistani Muslims in other parts of Britain clearly do not adopt sub-state identities as readily as in Scotland.
This may be because Scottish identity is indeed perceived as relatively inclusive by minority groups and that multicultural nationalism and multinational multicultural citizenship do prevail to some extent. But the third and final reason for caution in drawing this conclusion relates to evidence of Kymlicka's alternative postnational model of multicultural citizenship in Scotland. People in most minority groups are more likely to identify as British than are the White majority, even though this applies most obviously to Pakistani Muslims, once more suggesting they may be a somewhat unusual minority group in Scotland. Might this be attributable to the enduring transnational quality of Britishness highlighted by those such as Mycock (2010) ? The evidence for this seems less compelling than in Wales and (especially) England, where those minorities whose roots most obviously lie in the former empire are indeed the most likely to identify as British. But it would help explain why certain groups in Scotland (most obviously Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims) are particularly likely to see themselves as British. However, some other evidence suggests that Britishness may be viewed as a more inclusive identity by some people in minority groups, even in Scotland, because it is perceived as less related to natal origins. Whereas being born in Scotland seems a fundamentally important marker of Scottish identity, in contrast it seems that many migrants in Scotland become British over time.
Compared to these key markers of national identity, the effects on Scottish and British identification of the other variables considered are more modest. However, the findings perhaps suggest that the extent to which Kymlicka's postnational or multinational ideal types are appropriate in understanding the identification of minorities may be mediated to some extent by social class. Among minorities, as in the Scottish population more widely, sub-state national identities are more commonly expressed among working-class groups whereas those in middle-class occupations are comparatively likely to identify as British.
In closing, the limitations of the data and analysis should also be reiterated, particularly with regard to explaining variation in national identification across minority groups that appears unrelated to the key markers of identity. For example, it may be that Pakistani Muslims are relatively unusual because of the length of time they have been an established minority in Scotland (see e.g. Bond forthcoming). This might have served to normalise Scottish identification among this group, but this would need to be explored through further, more focused qualitative research, perhaps of a comparative nature.
Despite these limitations, the findings are based on an unprecedented data source that allows for the first time a robust overview of the national identification of people across diverse minority groups in Scotland, rather than focusing on one particular group or relying on very small and less reliable samples. This has shown that previous conclusions regarding the identification and integration of minorities in Scotland should be treated with some caution. Nevertheless, the (also unprecedented) comparison with other UK nations has also shown that to some extent at least Scotland is different and Scottish identity more inclusive compared to similar sub-state identities. This highlights the importance of taking both state and sub-state national identities into account, and recognising the potential significance of the specific substate context, when investigating the national identification of minorities in multination states more generally. 
